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MALINDA B. ORLIN
University of Maryland
School of Social Work

Recent state initiatives to change the AFDC program are usually
described as a unified welfare reform movement with the single goal of
decreasing welfare usage. However, analysis of state waiver applications
submitted to HHS finds no single purpose in the reforms. Additionally,
the net effect of the state experiments would be to increase usage by
expanding eligibility.

Welfare reform, or, more accurately welfare restructuring,
is at the forefront of policy and political debate. Driven by
the twin fiscal pressures of recession and rising human services costs, governors, state legislators and citizen commissions
throughout the country are debating public assistance purpose
and method. The result is a creative array of modifications to
the federal/state public assistance program Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
Wisconsin's Learnfare was an early experiment which received much media attention. Begun in 1988 Learnfare attempts
to reduce truancy and drop-out rates by tying school attendance
to the amount of the AFDC grant. From the beginning it was
regarded as punitive, because its premise was to sanction families by reducing an already meager grant if their teenage children did not regularly attend school. When considered within
the context of the unprecedented national reduction in the value
of AFDC benefits and the politicization of welfare, it is not
surprising that all state welfare reform activity became characterized as similarly punitive and anti-recipient. By early 1992
the collectivity of state welfare initiatives was described as a
single movement of the "new paternalism" using "carrots and
sticks" to change the behavior of recipients enforcing the "new
social contract" with the goals of saving money and decreasing
usage of welfare (U.S. Senate).
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Since AFDC is a federal/state program, all states must
operate their AFDC programs consistent with federal law and
regulation. To receive permission to alter their AFDC programs
at variance with federal standards, the state applies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for a waiver to conduct
an experiment, pilot, or demonstration project. Under section
1115(a) of the Social Security Act, the Secretary is authorized to
waive federal AFDC requirements to run experiments when the
projects are "likely to assist in promoting the objectives of" the
AFDC program. In the past three years states have been active in
requesting and receiving waivers. HHS reports approximately
30 waiver-based demonstration projects in effect in 19 states in
1991. In 1992 HHS received applications for 35 new 1115 Projects
from 20 different states (Center, 1993b).
A typological analysis of these applications shows sufficient
variability in state welfare reform activities to conclude that
it is inappropriate to describe them as a movement with a
single focus. The projects requesting a 1115 waiver include a
wide variety of program elements, which are not uniformly
punitive, paternalistic, or thrifty. On the contrary, the net effect
of the state initiatives would be to increase the costs of and
participation in the AFDC program.
Federal AFDC Eligibility Requirements
The majority of the 1115 Projects seek exemption from a
federal status, financial or eligibility requirement.
Status Eligibility Requirements
To be eligible for AFDC under federal law an individual
must be a U.S. citizen or a legal alien and not receiving SSI.
Further, to qualify for the status as a dependent child, the child
must be: (a) below age 18, (b) living with a caretaker relative
who is within a fixed degree of kinship, and (c) deprived of
parental support or care by the death, continued absence or
incapacity of either or both parents, or by the unemployment of
the principal earner parent. For a family to be eligible under
the unemployed parent provision, the principal earner must
meet three criteria of unemployment. The principal earner must
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be working less than 100 hours a month, have a recent work
history, and have been unemployed for at least 30 days prior
to application.
Financial Eligibility Requirements
After meeting the status requirements, since AFDC is a
means-tested program, a family must meet resource and income
limits. Federal law sets a resource limit of $1,000. States set their
own need standard and the family cannot qualify for aid unless
its income is below the state standard. Federal law then restricts eligibility to AFDC units whose gross income is less than
185% of that need standard. The federal and state income and
resources limits are applied to the family's countable income
and resources, meaning income and resources after exemptions
and disregards. Federal law determines what is to be included
as countable income, for example the $50 monthly limit on
child support which may be passed directly to the custodial
parent and the amount of earned income that can disregarded
and the duration of that disregard (Center, 1993a). In addition,
federal law states which people and their consequent income
and resources must, must not, or may be considered as part
of the AFDC unit. Even if not part of the AFDC unit, the
income and/or resources of certain designated individuals must
be considered, because their income is "deemed" available to
recipient, for example, stepparents' income.
Conduct Eligibility Requirements
Federal law currently requires three behaviors of recipients:
furnishing social security numbers; participation in the federal
work program Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS); and
cooperation with child support collection activities. Categories
of persons federally exempt from the JOBS requirements are
persons under 19 if they are in school, caretakers with children
under three years of age, and individuals too ill or incapacitated
to participate, over age 59, needed in the home to care for an
incapacitated or ill household member, too remote from the
work program site, more than three months pregnant, or already
working more than 30 hours a week.
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States have applied for waivers from all three types of federal eligibility requirements--status, financial and conduct. The
most significant status changes are requests to redefine absence
and unemployment as conditions of deprivation. Important
modifications of financial requirements include altering the formulas for disregards and exemptions to income, increasing the
resource limit, and redefining which persons' incomes must be
"deemed" available to the family. Proposals to add conduct requirements such as Learnfare which requires school attendance,
have received the most notoriety and are largely responsible
for the conceptualization of the state welfare reform activities
as a unified movement to control recipient behavior. However,
they are potentially the least significant of the state welfare
experiments.
Typology of "Fares"
It has become commonplace to use the substitute for welfare
formulation, such as learnfare, workfare and wedfare to describe
different welfare reform strategies. Presumably this rhetorical
device highlights the difference between present public assistance programs which are viewed negatively and the new proposal, which will hopefully be received positively because, no
matter what it is, it isn't welfare. Following is a typological
analysis of the elements of state programs submitted in 1992
for federal waiver according to their purpose using the welfare
device.
Activityfare
The purpose of activityfare is to insure that all recipients,
even if exempt from federal JOBS and educational requirements,
participate in some activity that will improve their or their
childrens' life chances. For example, HHS has authorized Utah
under its Single Parent Employment Demonstration to require
participation in activities such as family counseling, drug and
alcohol programs, weight reduction, life skills classes, etc. which
would prepare recipients for employment.
An important corollary developing with activityfare is the
concept of an individualized plan for families, which ranges
from a casework planning tool to a contract establishing the
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conditions for receiving assistance. A central element of the
Iowa Family Investment Program is the mandatory Family Investment Agreement (FIA) which outlines what the family must
do to achieve self-sufficiency and the time-line. Family participation via a FIA would be a condition of receiving assistance.
Assetfare
Assetfare programs establish resource limits over the federal
$1000 to allow families to accumulate assets which would facilitate their eventual independence from AFDC, such as savings
for education, security deposit on a good apartment, or a reliable vehicle for employment. Additionally, assetfare proposals
which would effect applicants as well as recipients would could
keep families from being forced to sell an important asset, such
as a vehicle, in order to qualify for a needed short-term income
support. The principles underlying assetfare are that public
assistance recipients should not be penalized for saving and that
eventual self-sufficiency requires the accumulation of assets.
Missouri's 21st Century Communities Demonstration Project
was approved with a $10,000 resource limit.
Babyfare
To eliminate subsequent births to individuals already receiving AFDC, two types of strategies are used-capping the size
of the grant so that it does not reflect the increased need generated by the birth of a baby and encouraging the use of family
planning. In the Wisconsin Parental and Family Responsibility
Demonstration Project families would receive only one-half the
payment increase for the birth of a baby and no increase for
subsequent births. In the Arkansas Reduction in AFDC Birth
Rates Project and the New Jersey Family Development Program,
where this is known as denial of aid for afterborn children,
there would be no increase in grant size for the newborn. Many
state programs pay bonuses for voluntary attendance at family
planning and effects of parenthood classes.
Benefare
To ease further the transition to unsubsidized employment
some states are experimenting with extending the transition
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support services, such as health and/or child care benefits,
beyond the 12 months required by the Family Support Act. The
Illinois Homeless Families Stabilization Project, for example,
allows extension of medical and child care benefits to families
terminated from AFDC for employment reasons for up to 24
months.
Diversionfare
This strategy attempts to divert persons from AFDC by
providing an emergency assistance grant if the one-time grant
will prevent the need for on-going AFDC support. The Utah
Single Parent Employment Demonstration provides job-ready
applicants who appear AFDC eligible with a diversion payment
in lieu of accepting their application.
Earnfare
One of the most significant categories of reforms are those
state programs which would permit families to keep more
money from sources other than AFDC without losing their
eligibility or having their grants reduced so a disincentive for
employment is created. The rationale for earnfare is to increase
the financial payoff for employment. The primary mechanism
is to expand the exclusions and disregards to countable income
by experimenting with different formulas for earned income
disregards. California is extending the $30 and one-third disregard indefinitely. Utah is instituting a permanent $100 plus
45% of gross earnings disregard, Michigan has been approved
to replace the $30 and one-third with a continuous disregard
of $200 plus 20% of the remainder of earnings. Iowa's Family
Investment Program calls for a permanent disregard of 50% of
earned income.
Another earnfare strategy is to exclude earnings. In To
Strengthen Michigan's Families Demonstration Project, the earnings of dependent children are excluded from calculations of
family income. In the South Carolina Private/For Profit Work
Experience Project earnings from on-the-job-training stipends
and other employment preparation activities are excluded.
Earnfare is also an important rationale behind the Vermont
proposal to send the entire child support payment directly to the
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family rather than indirectly through the AFDC grant. Vermont
policy makers assume it would provide a work incentive for
both parents. The child support obligated parent and the custodial parent could see the possibilities of receiving a combination
of earned income and child support payments sufficient to make
the family independent of AFDC.
The 100-hour rule presently required by the federal definition of unemployment creates a disincentive for full-time employment for several categories of workers possibly including
workers with low earnings potential, low skill levels, minimum
work experience, and large families. Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Vermont, and California have requested waivers
from the 100-hour rule as earnfare so that a two-parent family
would not be terminated from welfare if the principal earner
works full-time or more than 100 hours/month.
A fifth category of earnfare proposal changes the federally
required retrospective budgeting. The current retrospective budgeting system creates a deterrent to employment, because it may
take up to three months for grant adjustment to fully reflect
changes in earnings. Generally under retrospective budgeting
a grant for a month is based on income received two months
earlier. Thus when a recipient family begins employment the
grant is not reduced to reflect the earnings until the second
month. When earnings cease, the grant is not increased until
the second month following the loss of earnings. The Illinois Income Budgeting Project changes AFDC retrospective budgeting
rules to avoid the delay that retrospective budgeting causes in
adjusting the grant when employment begins and ends (Center,
1993b).
Edfare
These popular programs are intended to increase the school
attendance of children or child caretakers. Two sanction strategies for non-attendance are a reduction in the family's cash
benefit by a fixed amount (in Maryland's Primary Prevention
Initiative the amount is $25/month/child) and elimination of
the noncomplying individual when determining eligibility and
payment (Oklahoma Learnfare Program). Reward strategies are
also employed. For example, Virginia's Incentives to Advance
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Learning would reward families of middle school children who
maintain satisfactory attendance by providing the family with
benefits at 100% of need instead of 90% which is the current
payment standard statewide. The child is also directly rewarded
with small in-kind bonuses such as passes to movies and sports
events. The Ohio Learning, Earning and Parenting program
combines the sanction and reward approach by reducing the
grant $62 if the required person fails to attend school and
supplementing it $62 when they do. A small subset of edfare programs is concerned not only with attendance, but with
the quality of learning as measured by academic performance.
Proposals such as those which would give high school seniors
$200 upon graduation, provide honor roll high school students
a $10/month bonus, and exempt the income of students who
are employed as tutors, may perhaps correctly be described as
learnfare, not just edfare.
Fatherfare
The purpose of fatherfare is to involve non-custodial parents, primarily fathers, divorced and never married, in childrearing and preparation for employment. Two types of projects
have been proposed. Under the Illinois Paternal Involvement
Project the training, education, and employment services of
the JOBS program would be extended to non-recipient fathers
aged 18-35 who are receiving Food Stamps and whose children
receive AFDC. This would open the JOBS services to fathers.
Another approach to father involvement is the proposal to
send the complete child support payment to the family directly, not through the grant. The Vermont Family Independence
Project in its application for waiver from the $50/month child
support pass through limit, notes that under the present system,
the noncustodial parent does not see that their efforts make a
difference in the family's well-being and the children do not
recognize the contribution of their absent parent to their welfare.
The change, not using the child support payment over $50 to
offset the AFDC payment, should "... . improve the relationship
between noncustodial parents and their children." (Vermont,
p. IV-22).
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Magnetfare
In order to discourage in-migration, some states are proposing restricting the benefits of newcomers to the state by limiting
payments to recent migrants to the benefit level paid in the state
they came from, if that state's benefit is lower, for a period
of time such as six months or one year. Wyoming, California,
Wisconsin, Illinois and Iowa have requested to create these
two-tiered payment levels on the theory that their relatively
generous AFDC benefits act as magnets attracting welfare dependent migrants to them. The portion of the California Assistance Payments Demonstration Project proposal which would
have restricted benefits of non-residents was ruled unconstitutional on Jan. 28, 1993 by a federal judge for a U.S. District
Court on the grounds that it violates the constitutional right to
freedom to travel. That decision is being appealed by California.
Parentfare
Most states actively experimenting with their AFDC programs are attempting to make caretaker parents perform certain
parenting behaviors. Parentfare includes insuring that children
attend school and receive appropriate health care and that parents otherwise contribute to the financial and emotional support
of their children. Examples of approaches to parentfare are to
exclude the needs of an non-immunized child from the grant
for failure to provide primary health care, as in the Georgia
Preschool Immunization Project; bonuses for providing primary
health care to children; requiring co-payment for JOBS provided
child care (the Massachusetts Child Care Co-Payment Project
would require participants to pay $2/week/child); bonuses for
attending parenting education classes; bonuses or grant reductions related to school attendance for children; and allowing
families to exceed the $50 federally allowed child support limit.
Timefare
The purpose of timefare proposals, also known as timelimited welfare, is to establish a limit to the length of time
a recipient can receive AFDC, regardless of other factors of
eligibility. This is analogous to President Clinton's proposal for
a two-year limit to welfare. An example is the Vermont Family
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Independence Project which would limit single parent AFDC
households to 30 months of benefits and AFDC-UP households
to 15 months of benefits. At the end of the specified period families would receive benefits only in exchange for unsubsidized
employment or community service.
A variation on the use of time or duration of receipt to
influence welfare receipt is to establish a two-tier benefit system
where lower payments come into effect after a period of time,
regardless of whether there is a change in the family's need. It
is difficult to tell if this is timefare or merely a mechanism for
benefit reduction for everyone. It was proposed in the California
Welfare Reform Demonstration Project referendum which was
defeated by Californians in November 1992.
Wedfare
Programs whose purpose is to encourage marriage or at
least not discourage it are wedfare programs. The most significant wedfare approaches eliminate disincentives to marriage
for persons receiving AFDC and removes the incentive for two
parent families not receiving AFDC to separate so they can qualify. Examples of wedfare strategies to eliminate disincentives to
remarriage are programs which exclude from the calculation
of family income the income of a stepparent thus allowing a
family to retain eligibility for AFDC. In the New Jersey Family
Development Program, if an AFDC parent marries a person
who is not the children's parent, the children will remain eligible for AFDC if total annual household income does not
exceed 150% of the poverty level. The stepparent's earnings will
not be counted in determining the children's benefit amount.
Technically this eliminates the federal stepparent income deeming policy. The Iowa Family Investment Program includes a
wedfare element giving stepparents the same expanded work
deductions proposed for parents.
Waiving the work history rule in the Unemployed Parent
program are wedfare proposals which eliminate the pressure to
separate in families where the parents are married to each other,
residing in the same home, but where the principal earner does
not have sufficient work experience to qualify as unemployed.
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Conclusion

Even though the rhetoric of state welfare reform is of
satisfying taxpayers who are fed-up with welfare by changing
recipients forcing them to act responsibly in exchange for their
benefits, analysis of the state experiment applications shows that
their main effect would be to expand AFDC usage. When barriers to self-sufficiency are removed, they also remove barriers
to eligibility. The number of eligible persons would be significantly increased by assetfare, wedfare and earnfare experiments
which eliminate the deeming of stepparent income, eliminate
the 100 hour and previous work history rules establish higher
disregards of earned income, and permit the accumulation of
assets without losing eligibility.
Expenditures for services such as Medicaid, JOBS training
and employment, the creation of new counseling services and
transitional health, child care and transportation benefits would
be increased by activityfare, benefare, and fatherfare because
more people would be required to participate in or be given
access to the services, new services are created and duration of
services would be extended.
Even those proposed elements that look as though they
would reduce costs and eligibility-timefare, babyfare, and
magnetfare-have limited cost reduction possibilities. Most
timefare proposals, for example, specify that after the time limit
has expires, the family receives the benefit in exchange for
workfare or community service, not that they cease receiving all
financial support. Wisconsin is an exception. In Wisconsin the
durational limit is absolute. Magnetfare and babyfare, if they
are successful in preventing in-migration and afterbirths, will
not reduce costs. At most they would reduce the growth in
expenditures.
Review of the diverse program elements ranging from activityfare to wedfare for which the states requested federal waivers,
suggests there is no uniform state welfare reform movement.
The goals, strategies, and effects of the diverse 1115 programs
show that even though the rhetoric of welfare reform is consistently harsh and exclusive, program purposes and consequences
differ considerably.
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